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Abstract
We study a two-stage model, in which students are 1) admitted to college on the basis
of an entrance exam which is a noisy signal about their qualifications (type), and then 2)
those students who were admitted to college can be hired by an employer as a function of
their college grades, which are an independently drawn noisy signal of their type. Students
are drawn from one of two populations, which might have different type distributions. We
assume that the employer at the end of the pipeline is rational, in the sense that it computes
a posterior distribution on student type conditional on all information that it has available
(college admissions, grades, and group membership), and makes a decision based on posterior
expectation. We then study what kinds of fairness goals can be achieved by the college by
setting its admissions rule and grading policy. For example, the college might have the goal
of guaranteeing equal opportunity across populations: that the probability of passing through
the pipeline and being hired by the employer should be independent of group membership,
conditioned on type. Alternately, the college might have the goal of incentivizing the employer
to have a group blind hiring rule. We show that both goals can be achieved when the college
does not report grades. On the other hand, we show that under reasonable conditions, these
goals are impossible to achieve even in isolation when the college uses an (even minimally)
informative grading policy.
1 Introduction
For a variety of reasons, including unequal access to primary education, family support, and en-
richment activities, different demographic groups can vary widely in their level of preparation by
the time they reach their senior year of high school, when they apply for college. In an attempt
to correct for this unfortunate reality, many colleges in the United States follow some sort of affir-
mative action policy in their admissions, which is to say, their admissions decisions explicitly take
demographics into account. What is often unstated (and perhaps not even explicitly considered by
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the colleges) is what exactly the long term goals of these policies are, beyond the short term goal of
having a diverse freshman class. In this paper, we consider two explicit goals, and study the extent
to which they can be met in a simple two stage model:
1. Equal opportunity: The probability that an individual is accepted to college and then
ultimately hired by an employer may depend on an individual’s type, but conditioned on
their type, should not depend on their demographic group.
2. Elimination of Downstream Bias: Rational employers selecting employees from the col-
lege population should not make hiring decisions based on group membership.
Neither of these desiderata will necessarily be achieved by admissions rules that ignore de-
mographic information. For example, suppose college admissions is set by a uniform admissions
threshold on entrance exam scores. Assuming these scores are equally informative about all groups,
this will guarantee that conditioned on a student’s type, whether or not she is admitted to college
will be independent of her group membership, but it does not imply that whether or not she is ulti-
mately hired is independent of her group! This is because exam scores are only a noisy signal about
student type. Therefore, if two groups have different prior distributions on type, they will have
different posterior distributions on type when conditioned on being admitted to college according to
a group-blind admissions rule. The result will be that a Bayesian employer will insist that students
from a group with lower mean or higher variance will have to cross a higher threshold on their
college grades in order to be hired. In addition to incentivizing explicit group-based discrimination
by the employer, this also results in a failure of equal opportunity for the students, because once
admitted to college, two individuals of the same type might have to cross different grade thresholds
in order to be hired. Thus, a simple “group blind” admissions rule fails to achieve either goal 1 or
2 as laid out above. In this paper, we study the extent to which these goals can be achieved via
other means available to the college: in particular, how it admits and grades students.
1.1 Limitations of our Model
When interpreting our results, it is important to understand the scope and limitations of our model.
First, this paper considers fairness goals that are limited to preventing inequity from being further
propagated — treating opportunities at the high school level and earlier as fixed — and that do
not attempt to correct for past inequity. This manifests itself in that our “equal opportunity” goal
takes as given that the prospects for employment may “fairly” vary as a function of an individual’s
type at the time at which they apply for college, and does not attempt to address or correct the
historical forces that might have resulted in different groups having different type distributions to
begin with. Attempting to correct for this kind of historical inequity would require a “value-added
model” of education, in which colleges can change the type distributions of their student population
either through the direct effect of education, or through a second order effect on student behavior
before they apply. In our model, colleges do not change student types, they only serve as signaling
mechanisms. Similarly, our “equal opportunity” goal aims to equalize the probability that students
are hired conditioned on their types — but one might reasonably instead ask for a corrective notion
of fairness, in which the probability of passing through the pipeline is higher for the historically
disadvantaged group conditioned on type. We do not consider this.
Our model also ignores the possibility that exam scores and grades are themselves biased. We
explicitly assume the opposite — that exam scores and grades are unbiased estimators of student
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types, for both groups. If instead exam scores were systematically biased downwards for one group,
then the response of a rational employer to an admissions policy would be very different — because
students who made it through the college pipeline despite negative bias would have a higher relative
posterior probability of having a high type. There is evidence that effects of this sort are real [2].
The two kinds of fairness goals that we study do not speak to the size of the student of employee
population coming from each group. For example, in principle, one could satisfy both the equal
opportunity and elimination-of-downstream-bias goals that we propose, but at a cost of employing
very few individuals from one of the groups. However, we show that even without an additional
goal of having large representation from both groups, the fairness goals we set out cannot generally
be achieved.
Finally, we assume that employers are single-minded expectation maximizers, with no explicit
desire for fairness or diversity. Of course this is often not the case.
Despite these limitations and simplifying assumptions, we find that in the model we study,
many natural fairness goals are already impossible. We think that these negative results are likely
to persist in more complex models that attempt to capture additional realism.
1.2 Our Model and Results
We consider a simple model of admissions, grading and hiring that views the role of colleges only
as a means of signaling quality and performing a gatekeeping function, rather than as providing
explicit value added1. We consider two groups representing pre-defined subsets of the population,
divided according to socio-economic or other demographic lines. Each student from group i is
endowed with a type t, which is drawn independently from a Gaussian type distribution Pi that is
dependent on the students’ group membership. A student’s type ultimately measures her value to
an employer. We model employers as having a fixed cost C for hiring an individual, and a gain that
is proportional to their type. If the employer hires an individual who has type t, they obtain utility
t− C. A college can choose an admissions rule and a grading policy. Although students types are
unobservable, each student has an admissions exam score that is an observable unbiased estimator
of their type. We model exam scores as being distributed as a unit variance Gaussian, centered
at the student’s type. An admissions policy for the school is a mapping between exam scores and
admissions probabilities. We allow schools to set different admissions policies for different groups,
but for most of our results, we require the natural condition that admissions probabilities within
a group be monotonically non-decreasing in exam scores2. Deterministic monotone admissions
policies simply correspond to setting admissions thresholds based on exam scores. For simplicity, in
the body of the paper, we restrict attention to deterministic admissions rules, but in the Appendix,
we extend our results to cover probabilistic admissions rules as well.
Schools may also set a grading policy. A grade is also modeled as a Gaussian centered at a
student’s true type, but the school may choose the variance of the distribution. We assume that a
student’s grade is conditionally independent of her entrance exam score, conditioned on her type.
One limiting extreme (infinite variance) corresponds to committing not to report grades at all. This
1This is consistent with the signaling view of the role of colleges in the economics literature, beginning with [15]
2A non-monotone admissions rule would have the property that sometimes a student with a lower exam score
would have a higher probability of admission that a student with a higher exam score. Non-monotonicity within a
group is highly undesirable, because it would give some students a perverse incentive to intentionally try and lower
their exam scores. If such incentives were present, it would no longer be reasonable to model exam scores as unbiased
estimators of student types.
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limiting case is actually achievable because schools can simply opt not to share grades — in fact,
this practice has been adopted at several top business schools [7]. At the other limiting extreme,
types are perfectly observable. This extreme is generally not achievable, and we do not consider it
in this paper. In between, the school can modulate the strength of the signal that employers get
about student type, beyond the simple indicator that they were admitted to college.
Employers know the prior distributions Pi on student types, as well as the admissions and
grading policy of the school. They are rational expectation maximizers. When deciding whether or
not to hire a student, they will condition on all information available to them — a student’a group
membership, the fact that she was admitted to college under the college’s admissions policy, and the
grade that she received under the college’s grading policy — to form a posterior distribution about
the student’s type. They will hire exactly those students for whom they have positive expected
utility under this posterior distribution.
In order to incentivize a particular employer to use a hiring rule that is independent of group
membership, it is necessary to set admissions and grading policies such that for every student ad-
mitted to the school, and for every grade g that she may receive, the indicator that the conditional
expectation of her type t is above the employer’s hiring cost C is independent of the student’s
group membership. If there is uncertainty about what the employer’s hiring cost C is, or if there
are multiple employers, then it is necessary to guarantee this property for an interval of hiring
costs C ∈ [C−, C+] rather than for just a fixed cost. We distinguish these two cases. We call this
property Irrelevance of Group Membership (IGM), in the single threshold and multiple threshold
case respectively. A seemingly stronger property that we might desire is that the posterior dis-
tribution on student types conditional on admission to college is identical for both groups. We
call this property strong Irrelevance of Group Membership (sIGM). Because it symmetrizes the
two groups, it in particular guarantees that members of both groups will be treated identically by
rational decision makers at any further stage down the decision making pipeline. We show that
in the presence of finite, nonzero variance in both exam scores and grades, IGM in the multiple
threshold case implies sIGM. Finally, we say that an admissions rule and grading policy satisfy the
equal opportunity condition, if a student’s probability of making it all the way through the pipeline
— i.e. being admitted to college and then being hired by the employer, is independent of her
group conditioned on her type. Trivially, any group-symmetric admissions policy will satisfy both
conditions if the two group type distributions are identical, so for the results that follow, we always
assume that the group type distributions are distinct — differing in their mean, their variance, or
both.
First, to emphasize that our impossibility results will crucially depend on the fact that exam
scores are only a noisy signal of student ability, we consider the noiseless case, in which college
admissions can be decided directly as a function of student type (this corresponds to the case in
which exam scores have no noise). In this case, we can “have it all”: there is a simple monotone
admissions rule that guarantees both the equal opportunity condition, and satisfies IGM for multiple
thresholds — for any grading policy that the school might choose. After establishing this simple
result, in the rest of the paper we move on to the more realistic case in which exam scores are only
a noisy signal of student type.
Next, we study what is possible if the college chooses to not report grades at all. In this case,
we can also “have it all” — simply by setting a sufficiently high, group independent admissions
threshold, a school can achieve both equal opportunity and IGM for multiple thresholds. This gives
another view of the effects of practicing grade non-disclosure at highly selective schools [7].
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Finally, in the bulk of the paper, we study the common case in which the college uses informative
grades — i.e. sets the variance of its grade distribution to be some finite value. In this case, we show
that it is possible to obtain IGM in the single threshold case, but that no monotone admissions rule
can obtain sIGM. Because of the equivalence between sIGM and IGM for the multiple threshold
case, this implies that no monotone admissions rule can obtain IGM in the multiple threshold case,
even in isolation. Next, we consider the equal opportunity condition. One trivial way to obtain it
is to simply admit nobody to college. We show that this is in general the only way in the multiple
thresholds case: no non-zero monotone admissions rule can satisfy the equal opportunity condition,
even in isolation.
1.3 Related Work
Our work fits into two streams of research. Within the recent line of work on algorithmic fairness,
the most closely related work is that of Chouldechova [3] and Kleinberg, Mullainathan, and Ragha-
van [12]. Both of these papers prove the impossibility of simultaneously satisfying certain fairness
desiderata in batch classification and regression settings. Broadly speaking, both papers show the
impossibility of simultaneously equalizing false positive and false negative rates (related to our
equal opportunity goal — see also [8]) and positive predictive value or calibration (related to our
IGM goals). Our work is quite different, however: the goals that we study are not direct properties
of the classification rule in question (in our case, the college admissions rule), but instead properties
of its downstream effects. And while the work of [3, 12] shows the impossibility of simultaneously
satisfying these fairness criteria, in our setting, we show that they are often impossible to satisfy
even in isolation.
Our paper also fits into an older line of work studying economic models of discrimination and
affirmative action, which has its modern roots in [1] and [14]. For example, Coate and Loury [5]
and Foster and Vohra [6] study two stage models in which students from two different groups (who
are a-priori identical) can in the first stage choose whether or not to make a costly investment
in themselves, which will increase their value to employers. In the 2nd stage, employers may set
a hiring rule that acts on a noisy signal about student quality. These works show the existence
of a self-confirming equilibrium, in which only one group makes investments in themselves and
are subsequently given employment opportunities, and consider interventions which can escape
these discriminatory equilibria. These works can be viewed as studying the “upstream effects” of
affirmative action policies, and explaining the mechanics by which different student populations may
end up with different type distributions. The effect of the interventions proposed in these models
is very slow, because it requires a new generation of students to recognize the opportunities made
available to them via affirmative action policies and make costly investments in their education in
response, well before they enter the job market. In contrast, our work can be viewed as studying
the “downstream effects” of these policies and examining shorter term effects which can be realized
in a time frame that need not be long enough for type distributions to change.
More recently, the computer science community has begun studying fairness desiderata in dy-
namic models. Jabbari et al study the costs (measured as their effect on the rate of learning) of
imposing fairness constraints on learners in general Markov decision processes [10]. Hu and Chen
[9] study a dynamic model of the labor market similar to that of [5, 6] in which two populations
are symmetric, but can choose to exert costly effort in order to improve their value to an employer.
They study a two stage model of a labor market in which interventions in a “temporary” labor
market can lead to high welfare symmetric equilibrium in the long run. Liu et al. [13] study a two
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round model of lending in which lending decisions in the first round can change the type distribu-
tion of applicants in the 2nd round, according to a known, exogenously specified function. They
study how statistical constraints on the lending rule can improve or harm outcomes as compared
to a myopic (i.e. ignoring dynamic effects) profit maximizing rule, and find that for two kinds of
interventions, both improvement and harm are possible, depending on the details of how lending
effects the type distribution. Finally, [11] studied the regulator’s problem of providing financial
incentives for a lender to satisfy fairness constraints in an online classification setting.
2 Model
We consider two populations of students, 1 and 2. In population i ∈ {1, 2}, each student has a
type drawn from a Gaussian distribution Pi = N
(
µi, σ
2
i
)
with mean µi and variance σ
2
i . Since
our problem is trivial if P1 = P2, in this paper we assume always that P1 6= P2, i.e. the type
distributions differ either in their mean, or their variance, or both. We denote by Ti the random
variable that represents the type of a student from population i. Throughout the paper, φ denotes
the probability density function and Φ the cumulative density function of a standard normal random
variable with mean 0 and variance 1.
Each student takes a standardized test (SAT, etc.) and obtains a score given by
Si = Ti +X
where X follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1, that does not depend on the
population i, i.e., the student’s score is a noisy but unbiased estimate of his type.
Additionally, we consider a university that admits students from both populations. The uni-
versity designs an admission rule Ai : R → [0, 1] for each population i, such that a student from
population i with score s is accepted with probability Ai(s). We also abuse notation and let Ai
denote the binary random variable whose value is 1 if a student is accepted, and 0 otherwise. This
admission rule is required to be monotone non-decreasing; i.e. an increase in exam score cannot
lead to a decrease in admissions probability. We say that an admissions rule is deterministic if
Ai(s) ∈ {0, 1}. A deterministic monotone admissions rule is characterized by a threshold βi such
that a student is accepted if and only if Si ≥ βi. We call such rules“thresholding admissions
rules”. We focus on thresholding admissions rules in the body of this paper, but extend our results
to probabilistic admissions rules to the Appendix. For simplicity of notation, we will often write
xi(t) = Pr [Ai = 1|Ti = t] (Note that xi(t) = Pr [Si ≥ βi|Ti = t] in the deterministic case).
Every student who is admitted to the university receives a grade, given by:
Gi = Ti + Y
where Y follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance γ2 that does not depend on the
population i. γ can be set by the university, and represents the strength of the signal provided by a
grading policy3. In our model, the University must commit to a single grading policy to use across
groups.
3In actuality, of course, students receive many grades, not just one. But note that when one averages two normally
distributed random variables, the result is also normally distributed, but with lower variance. Hence, one way to
modulate the variance of a grade signal is to modulate the number of grades computed. The more assignments and
exams that are graded, the lower the variance of the signal. The fewer that are graded, the higher the variance.
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Finally, an employer makes a hiring decision for each student that graduates from the university.
The employer knows the priors Pi, the admission rules A1, A2 used by the school, the grading policy
γ, and observes the grades of the students (as well as the fact that they were admitted to the school).
The employer’s expected utility for accepting a university graduate from population i with grade
g is then given by
E [Ti|Gi = g,Ai = 1]− C
where C is the cost for the employer to hire a student. The employer hires a university graduate
from population i with grade g if and only if
E [Ti|Gi = g,Ai = 1] ≥ C
Throughout the paper, we study the feasibility of achieving the following fairness goals:
Definition 1 (Equal opportunity). Equal opportunity holds if and only if the probability of a student
being hired by the employer conditional on his type is independent of the student’s group. I.e. if
for all types t ∈ R,∫
g
Pr [G1 = g,A1 = 1|T1 = t]1{E [T1|G1 = g,A1 = 1] ≥ C}dg
=
∫
g
Pr [G2 = g,A2 = 1|T2 = t]1{E [T2|G2 = g,A2 = 1] ≥ C}dg
Definition 2 (Irrelevance of Group Membership). Irrelevance of Group Membership (IGM) holds
if and only if, conditional on admission by the school and on grade g, the employer’s decision on
whether to hire a student is independent of the student’s group. I.e. if for all grades g ∈ R,
E [T1|G1 = g,A1 = 1] ≥ C ⇔ E [T2|G2 = g,A2 = 1] ≥ C
We further introduce a robust version of IGM, called strong Irrelevance of Group Membership,
that symmetrizes the two populations and guarantees that members of both populations will be
treated identically by rational decision makers at any further stage of the decision making pipeline.
Definition 3 (strong Irrelevance of Group Membership). Strong Irrelevance of Group Membership
(sIGM) holds if and only if, conditional on admission by the school and on grade g, the employer’s
posterior on a student’s type is independent of the student’s population. I.e., for all g ∈ R, for all
t ∈ R,
Pr [T1 = t|G1 = g,A1 = 1] = Pr [T2 = t|G2 = g,A2 = 1]
We note that sIGM holds if and only if the posterior on students’ types conditional on admission
by the school are identical:
Claim 1. sIGM holds if and only if for all t ∈ R:
Pr [T1 = t|A1 = 1] = Pr [T2 = t|A2 = 1]
Proof. See Appendix A.1
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3 Inference Preliminaries
In this section, we derive some basic properties of the joint distributions on student types, exam
scores, admissions rules, and grades that are relevant for reasoning about the employer’s Bayesian
inference task. We will draw upon these basic results in the coming sections.
3.1 Preliminaries on Gaussians and Multivariate Gaussians
First, we observe that together, student types, exam scores, and grades are distributed according
to a multi-variate Gaussian.
Claim 2. (Ti, Si, Gi) follows a multivariate normal distribution.
Proof. A set of random variables is distributed according to a multivariate normal distribution if
every linear combination of the variables is distributed as a univariate normal distribution. For all
a, b, c ∈ R, aTi + bSi + cGi = (a+ b+ c)Ti + bXi + cYi follows a normal distribution as the sum of
independent normal random variables.
We now quote a basic fact about the conditional distribution that results when one starts with
a multi-variate normal distribution, and conditions on the realization of a subset of its coordinates.
Claim 3. Let n ≥ 2 be an integer. Let Z ∈ Rn be a random variable following a multi-variate
normal distribution. Let Z = (Z1, Z2) where Zi ∈ Rni with n1 + n2 = n. Suppose Z has mean
m = (m1,m2) where mi ∈ Rni, and covariance matrix
Σ =
[
Σ11 Σ12
Σ21 Σ22
]
where Σij ∈ Rni×nj . Then E [Z1|Z2 = z2] = m1 + Σ12Σ−122 (z2 −m2) and Var [Z1|Z2 = z2] = Σ11 −
Σ12Σ
−1
22 Σ21.
Proof. See lecture notes [4].
The following technical lemma will also be useful for us.
Claim 4. The hazard rate H(x) = φ(x)1−Φ(x) of a standard normal random variable is increasing, and
satisfies
lim
x→−∞H(x) = 0, H(x) = x+ ox→+∞(1)
This is a commonly known result in the literature on probability theory and statistics. For
completeness, we provide a proof in Appendix A.2.
3.2 Employer’s First Moment Inference
The main lemma of this section characterizes the employer’s Bayesian inference task when the col-
lege is using a threshold admissions rule: the posterior expectation of a student’s type, conditioned
on their exam score being sufficiently high to cross the admissions threshold, and on their observed
grade. In the appendix, we give the corresponding inference rule for the employer when the college
can use an arbitrary monotone admissions rule.
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Lemma 1.
E [Ti|Si ≥ βi, Gi = g]
=
γ2
σ2i + γ
2
µi +
σ2i
σ2 + γ2
g
+
γ2σ2i√
(σ2i + γ
2)(σ2i + γ
2 + γ2σ2i )
·H

 (σ2i + γ2) · βi − γ2µi − σ2i g√
(σ2i + γ
2)(σ2i + γ
2 + γ2σ2i )


where H(x) = φ(x)1−Φ(x) is the Hazard function of a standard normal random variable.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.3.
A corollary of the previous lemma is that the posterior expectation computed by the employer
will satisfy a number of nice regularity conditions which will be useful in proving our impossibility
results:
Corollary 1. ei(µi, σi, βi, g) = E [Ti|Si ≥ βi, Gi = g] is continuous, differentiable, and strictly in-
creasing in each of µi, g and βi. Further,
lim
g→−∞ e(µi, σi, βi, g) = −∞,
lim
g→+∞ ei(µi, σi, βi, g) = +∞,
and
lim
βi→−∞
e(µi, σi, βi, g) =
γ2
σ2i + γ
2
µi +
σ2i
σ2 + γ2
g,
lim
βi→+∞
e(µi, σi, βi, g) = +∞.
Proof. See Appendix A.4
Finally, we define a quantity that will be useful to make reference to in a number of our
forthcoming arguments: the minimum grade that results in a student from group i being hired by
the employer, given a fixed admissions rule.
Definition 4 (Hiring threshold on grades). We define g∗i (C) = min{g : E [Ti|Si ≥ βi, Gi = g] ≥ C}
the inverse function of g → E [Ti|Si ≥ βi, Gi = g].
By Corollary 1, g∗i (.) is a well-defined function on domain R, and is continuous, differentiable,
and strictly increasing.
3.3 Moments of the posterior distribution for monotone admission rules
The following lemma holds for the general case of monotone, randomized admission rules, and is
useful in characterizing the moments of the distribution of types conditional on Ai = 1 and G = g
in population i:
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Lemma 2. Let Ai(.) be a non-decreasing, non-zero, possibly randomized admission rule. For all
g ∈ R, E [T ki |Gi = g,Ai = 1] is finite and differentiable in g, and its derivative satisfies the following
equation:
∂
∂g
Ei
[
T ki
∣∣∣Gi = g,Ai = 1]
=
1
γ2
Ei
[
T k+1i
∣∣∣Gi = g,Ai = 1]
− 1
γ2
Ei
[
T ki
∣∣∣Gi = g,Ai = 1] · Ei [Ti|Gi = g,Ai = 1] .
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.5.
4 When Both Conditions are Satisfiable
In this section, we observe that there are two settings in which it is possible to “have it all” —
satisfying both IGM and equal opportunity even in the multiple threshold case. The first setting
is that of noiseless exam scores: when student types are perfectly observable by the school. The
second setting is when the school opts not to report grades. We view the first setting as generally
unrealisable, since any student evaluation will involve some degree of stochasticity. However the
2nd case — in which a school opts not to report grades — can be realized.
4.1 Noiseless Exam Scores (Observable Types)
First, we observe that if schools can perfectly observe student types (we have noiseless exam scores
with Si = Ti), then there is a simple threshold admissions rule that simultaneously achieves IGM
and equal opportunity, even in the multiple threshold case. The ideas is simple: Given a range of
employer costs [C−, C+], the college simply sets an admissions threshold of C+ or higher, using
the same threshold for members of both groups. Because the threshold is the same for both
groups, the probability of being admitted to college is a function only of type, and independent
of group membership conditioned on type. Because scores were noiseless, admissions to college
deterministically certifies that a student’s type ti ≥ C+, and so the employer chooses to hire
everyone, independently of the grade they receive (and independently of their group membership).
Hence, the probability of being hired is the same as the probability of being accepted to college,
and is independent of group membership conditioned on type, and the employer’s hiring rule is
independent of group membership.
Claim 5. Suppose Si = Ti, i.e. a student’s score perfectly reveals his type. Then for any hiring
interval of hiring costs [C−, C+] ∈ R, the non-zero admissions rule:
Ai(s) = 1⇔ s ≥ C+
for both groups i ∈ {1, 2} satisfies IGM and equal opportunity when paired with any grading policy.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
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Claim 6. Suppose the school does not assign grades to students. Then for any hiring interval of
hiring costs [C−, C+] ∈ R, the non-zero thresholding admissions rule:
Ai(s) = 1⇔ s ≥ β
for both groups i ∈ {1, 2} satisfies IGM and equal opportunity when β is large enough.
Proof. For β big enough, E [Ti|Si ≥ β] ≥ C+ as
limβ→+∞ E [Ti|Si ≥ β] = +∞; this can be seen either by following the same steps as in the proof
of Lemma 1 to obtain that
E [Ti|Si ≥ β] = µi + σ
2
i√
1 + σ2i
H

 βi − µi√
1 + σ2i


which tends to +∞ when βi → +∞ by Claim 4. Another way of deriving this expression is by noting
that not having a grade is equivalent to having an uninformative grade, i.e. to having γ → +∞.
Now, let β be large enough such that in both populations, such that E [Ti|Si ≥ β] ≥ C+. IGM
immediately holds as every student that is accepted by the school is hired by the employer. Equal
opportunity holds because the probability of a student with type t being hired by the employer is
exactly the probability that he is admitted by the school (every student admitted by the school is
hired by the employer), hence is given by
Pr [Si ≥ β|Ti = t] =
∫
s≥β
φ(s− t)dt,
and is independent of the student’s population.
Note that this result is achieved by having the school set a very high admissions threshold
(uniformly for both groups), and declining to give grades. Hence, declining to give grades may be a
reasonable strategy for promoting our fairness goals in a highly selective school, but does not work
when admissions thresholds must be lower. We note that the practice of grade witholding in MBA
programs seems to be limited to the very top programs [7].
In the remainder of the paper we consider the case in which exam scores have positive finite
variance, and in which the college uses a grading policy with positive finite variance. What will be
possible will depend on whether we are in the single or multiple threshold case.
5 The Single Threshold Case
In this section, we consider what is possible when there is only a single employer with a hiring cost
C that is known to the college. We show that in this case, IGM can always be achieved, but that
it is impossible to achieve sIGM.
5.1 IGM can always be achieved
The main idea is as follows: For any grading scheme, and with a single threshold C in mind, the
college can separately set different admissions thresholds β∗1 and β
∗
2 for the two groups respectively
such that the posterior expectation for a student type from each group crosses the threshold of C
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at a grade g∗, which can be made to be the same for both populations. Since the only thing that
matters in the employer’s hiring decision is whether or not the student’s expected type is above
or below C, this is enough to cause the employer’s hiring decision to be independent of group
membership. The next lemma establishes that it is always possible to find such thresholds:
Lemma 3. For any C in R, there exists thresholds β∗1 and β
∗
2 and a grade g
∗ such that
E [T1|G1 = g∗, S1 ≥ β∗1 ] = E [T2|G2 = g∗, S2 ≥ β∗2 ] = C
Proof. It follows by Corollary 1 that
E [Ti|Gi = g, Si ≥ βi]
is continuous in βi and must reach any value between
γ2
σ2i+γ
2µi +
σ2i
σ2i +γ
2 g and +∞. For g∗ small
enough, it must be the case that
γ2
σ2i + γ
2
µi +
σ2i
σ2i + γ
2
g∗ ≤ C < +∞,
hence there exists β∗i such that
E [Ti|Gi = g∗, Si ≥ β∗i ] = C.
Corollary 2. Fix any C in R. When the school uses thresholding admission rules with thresholds
β∗1 and β
∗
2 , IGM holds for that C.
Proof. E [Ti|Gi = g, Si ≥ β∗i ] is a strictly increasing function of g by Corollary 1 , therefore the
employer accepts students from any population if and only if g ≥ g∗ where g∗ is population-
independent, which proves the results.
5.2 sIGM is impossible
We now show that strong IGM — making the posterior distributions for both groups identical
— is impossible. In addition to its intrinsic interest, this result will be a key ingredient in our
impossibility results for the multiple threshold setting.
Lemma 4. Suppose the priors are distinct. For any two thresholds β1 and β2, there must exists
t ∈ R such that
Pr [T1 = t|S1 ≥ β1] 6= Pr [T2 = t|S2 ≥ β2]
I.e., sIGM cannot hold.
Proof. Let xi(t) = Pr [Si ≥ βi|Ti = t]. Suppose for all t ∈ R, sIGM holds, i.e.
Pr [T1 = t|S1 ≥ β1] 6= Pr [T2 = t|S2 ≥ β2]
by Claim 1. Then
x1(t)φ
(
t−µ1
σ1
)
Pr [S1 ≥ β1] =
x2(t)φ
(
t−µ2
σ2
)
Pr [S2 ≥ β2]
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hence
x1(t)
x2(t)
=
σ1 Pr [S1 ≥ β1]
σ2 Pr [S2 ≥ β2] · exp
(
(t− µ2)2
2σ2
− (t− µ1)
2
2σ21
)
x1(.) and x2(.) are non-decreasing functions with values in [0, 1], and xi(t) =
∫
s≥βi φ(s − t)ds is
non-zero; therefore, limt=+∞ xi(t) exists and is strictly positive. It must then be the case that
x1(t)
x2(t)
has a finite and strictly positive limit in +∞. On the other hand,
exp
(
(t− µ2)2
2σ2
− (t− µ1)
2
2σ21
)
= K exp
(
t2
2
(
1
σ22
− 1
σ21
)
+
(
µ1
σ21
− µ2
σ22
)
t
)
for some constant K. It is easy to see that the above quantity tends to either +∞ or 0 as t→ +∞
as long as either σ1 6= σ2 or µ1 6= µ2 (one of 1σ2
2
− 1
σ2
1
and µ1
σ2
1
− µ2
σ2
2
must be non-zero). This leads to
a contradiction.
5.3 Equal opportunity
We defer the technical results of this section to Appendix B. Lemma 5 shows that for thresholding
admission rules, IGM and equal opportunity cannot simultaneously hold for Gaussian priors with
the same variance but different mean. This shows that obtaining fairness in the general case is
significantly more difficult than in the simple cases in which the types are observable and the
school does not assign grades. Lemma 6 shows that arguably stringent conditions on the grade
accuracy and the thresholds set by the school must hold for equal opportunity to be possible. We
conjecture that these conditions are, in general, impossible to satisfy, making equal opportunity
impossible to satisfy even in isolation, in the single threshold case. As we will see in the next
section, it is impossible to satisfy in the multiple-threshold case.
6 The Multiple Threshold Case
In this section, we turn to the multiple threshold case, which we view as the main setting of interest.
In this case, we ask whether we can achieve IGM and equal opportunity not just with respect to
a single known hiring cost C, but with respect to an entire interval of hiring costs C ∈ [C−, C+].
This will be the case when there are multiple employers, or simply when there is some uncertainty
about the hiring threshold used by a single employer.
6.1 IGM is Impossible
In this section, we show that IGM is impossible to achieve even in isolation. The proof proceeds
by showing that in the multiple threshold case, IGM must imply sIGM — i.e. that the posterior
distributions conditional on admission to college are identical for both groups. Impossibility then
follows from the impossibility of achieving sIGM (even for a single threshold), which we proved in
the last section.
We first state a technical lemma, showing that if we satisfy IGM for every employer cost C in
a continuous interval, we must actually be equalizing the posterior expected type across groups for
every grade g in some other continuous interval.
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Claim 7. Let C
¯
< C¯. Suppose that for all C ∈ (C
¯
, C¯),
E [T1|G1 = g, S1 ≥ β1] ≥ C ⇔ E [T2|G2 = g, S2 ≥ β2] ≥ C,
then it must be the case that for g in some interval (a, b),
E [T1|G1 = g, S1 ≥ β1] = E [T2|G2 = g, S2 ≥ β2]
Proof. Let a = g∗1(C¯
) and b = g∗1(C¯) where g
∗
1(.) is the strictly increasing inverse of g → E [T1|G1 = g,A1 = 1]
as per Claim 1 and Definition 4. Suppose there exists g ∈ (a, b) such that
E [T1|A1 = 1, G1 = g] > E [T2|A2 = 1, G2 = g] ,
then for C = E [T1|A1 = 1, G1 = g] ∈ (C
¯
, C¯), it must be the case that
E [T1|A1 = 1, G1 = g] ≥ C > E [T2|A2 = 1, G2 = g]
which contradicts the assumption of the claim. Now, suppose there exists g ∈ (a, b) such that
E [T1|A1 = 1, G1 = g] < E [T2|A2 = 1, G2 = g] ,
then for ǫ > 0 small enough, C = E [T1|A1 = 1, G1 = g] + ǫ ∈ (C
¯
, C¯) and
E [T1|A1 = 1, G1 = g] < C ≤ E [T2|A2 = 1, G2 = g]
which also contradicts the assumption of the claim. Therefore, it must be the case that for all
g ∈ (a, b),
E [T1|A1 = 1, G1 = g] = E [T2|A2 = 1, G2 = g]
We can now go on to prove the main theorem in this section:
Theorem 1. Suppose the priors are distinct, then IGM cannot for all hiring costs C ∈ (C
¯
, C¯).
Proof. By Claim 7, it must be the case that for all g ∈ (a, b) for some interval (a, b), E [T1|G1 = g, S1 ≥ β1] =
E [T2|G2 = g, S2 ≥ β2]. For all g in (a, b), by Lemma 2
∂
∂g
E [T1|G1 = g, S1 ≥ β1] = ∂
∂g
E [T2|G2 = g, S2 ≥ β2]
and hence E
[
T 21 |G1 = g, S1 ≥ β1
]
= E
[
T 22 |G2 = g, S2 ≥ β2
]
. It is easy to see that using the same
argument by induction yields that for all integers k,
E
[
T k1 |G1 = g, S1 ≥ β1
]
= E
[
T k2 |G2 = g, S1 ≥ β1
]
Since the distributions of types for the two populations conditional on Gi = g, Si ≥ βi admit
a moment generating function (this follows immediately from the fact that Pi admits a moment
generating function) and have identical moments, it must be that the distributions are the same
for all g ∈ (a, b). I.e., for all g ∈ (a, b), we have
Pr [T1 = t|G1 = g, S1 ≥ β1] = Pr [T2 = t|G2 = g, S1 ≥ β1]
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We have that in population i,
Pr [Ti = t|Gi = g, Si ≥ βi] =
Pr [Ti = t|Si ≥ βi]φ
(
g−t
γ
)
∫
t Pr [Ti = t|Si ≥ βi]φ
(
g−t
γ
)
dt
Note that
∫
t Pr [Ti = t|Si ≥ βi]φ
(
g−t
γ
)
dt is a function of g only, that we will denote pi(g) from
now on.
Pr [T1 = t|G1 = g, S1 ≥ βi] = Pr [T2 = t|G2 = g, S2 ≥ β2]
implies
Pr [T1 = t|S1 ≥ β1]
Pr [T2 = t|S2 ≥ β2] =
p1(g)
p2(g)
for all g ∈ (a, b) and t ∈ R. Pr [T1 = t|S1 ≥ β1] and Pr [T2 = t|S2 ≥ β2] are both probability density
functions that integrate to 1, so it must be the case that p1(g)p2(g) = 1 and Pr [T1 = t|S1 ≥ β1] =
Pr [T2 = t|S2 ≥ β2]. Therefore, sIGM must hold, which we have shown is impossible in Lemma
4.
6.2 Equal opportunity cannot hold
Finally, we show that in the multiple threshold case, it is also impossible to satisfy the equal
opportunity condition.
Theorem 2. Suppose the priors are distinct. There exist no thresholding admission rules such that
equal opportunity is guaranteed for all C ∈ (C
¯
, C¯), for any C
¯
< C¯.
Proof. It is easy to see xi(t) =
∫
sAi(s)φ(s− t)ds =
∫
uAi(u+ t)φ(u)du is monotone non-decreasing
in t and non-zero. Remember
ei(g) = E [Ti|Gi = g, Si ≥ βi]
has a strictly increasing and differentiable inverse g∗i (.) on (−∞,+∞) by Corollary 1, and a student
is hired by the employer if and only if g ≥ g∗i (C). A student with type t in population i gets therefore
hired with probability∫
g≥g∗(C)
xi(t)φ
(
g − t
γ
)
dt = xi(t)
(
1−Φ
(
g∗i (C)− t
γ
))
equal opportunity then imply that ∀t ∈ R, C ∈ (C
¯
, C¯),
x1(t)
x2(t)
·
(
1− Φ
(
g∗1(C)− t
γ
))
=
(
1− Φ
(
g∗2(C)− t
γ
))
Taking the first order derivative in C of both sides of the above equation, we have that for all
C ∈ (C
¯
, C¯), for all t ∈ R,
x1(t)
x2(t)
·
∂g∗
1
∂C (C)
∂g∗
2
∂C (C)
=
φ
(
g∗2(C)−t
γ
)
φ
(
g∗
1
(C)−t
γ
)
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Suppose for some C ∈ (C
¯
, C¯), g∗1(C) 6= g∗2(C). Without loss of generality, renumber the populations
such that g∗2(C) > g
∗
1(C). We have that
φ
(
g∗
2
(C)−t
γ
)
φ
(
g∗
1
(C)−t
γ
) = exp(2 (g∗2(C)− g∗1(C)) t+ g∗1(C)2 − g∗2(C)2
2γ2
)
and we know that g∗i (.) is a strictly increasing function so
∂g∗
2
∂C (C) > 0 so it must be the case that
lim
t→+∞
x1(t)
x2(t)
= +∞.
Since x1(t) is upper-bounded by 1, this implies in particular that x2(t) → 0 as t → +∞, which
contradicts x2(.) being a non-zero, non-decreasing function. Hence, it must be the case that for all
C ∈ (C
¯
, C¯), g∗1(C) = g
∗
2(C), i.e. IGM holds. By Lemma 1, this is impossible.
7 Conclusion
We consider two natural fairness goals that a college might have for its affirmative action policies:
granting equal opportunity to individuals with the same type when graduating from high school,
independent of their group membership, and incentivizing downstream employers to make hiring
decisions that are independent of group membership. We show that these goals can be simulta-
neously achieved by highly selective colleges (i.e. those with very high admissions thresholds) —
but only if they do not report grades to employers. This provides another view on this practice,
which is followed by several highly selective MBA programs. On the other hand, we find that
these goals are generally unachievable even in isolation if schools report informative grades. These
impossibility results crucially hinge on the fact that exam scores and grades provide only noisy
signals about student types, and hence require rational expectation maximizers to reason about
prior type distributions, which can vary by group.
Our paper leaves open a natural technical question: can a college set admissions and informative
grading policies to realize the equal opportunity condition, in the single threshold case? We con-
jecture that the answer to this question is no, and in the Appendix, we give a theorem supporting
this conjecture — ruling out the possibility for deterministic admissions rules in every case except
when the grading variance is exactly 1.
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A Omitted proofs
A.1 Proof of Claim 1
Pr [Ti = t|Gi = g,Ai = 1]
=
Pr [(Gi = g|Ti = t) |Ai = 1] · Pr [Ti = t|Ai = 1]
Pr [Gi = g|Ai = 1]
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Remembering that Gi = Ti + Y where Y ∼ N
(
0, γ2
)
, we have
Pr [(Gi = g|Ti = t) |Ai = 1] = Pr [Y = g − t] = φ
(
g − t
γ
)
,
does not depend on the population i, hence sIGM holds if and only if
Pr [T1 = t|A1 = 1] = Pr [G1 = g|A1 = 1]
Pr [G2 = g|A2 = 1] · Pr [T2 = t|A2 = 1]
Pr [T1 = t|A1 = 1] and Pr [T2 = t|A2 = 1] are probability density functions over t that both integrate
to 1, and Pr[G1=g|A1=1]Pr[G2=g|A2=1] is constant in t, therefore the above equation holds if and only if
Pr [T1 = t|A1 = 1] = Pr [T2 = t|A2 = 1] .
and
Pr [G1 = g|A1 = 1] = Pr [G2 = g|A2 = 1] .
This is equivalent to simply
Pr [T1 = t|A1 = 1] = Pr [T2 = t|A2 = 1] ,
noting that when the posterior over types after admission by the school are equal, the distribution
of grades must be equal too, as the distribution of Y is population-independent.
A.2 Proof of Claim 4
We start by showing bounds on H(x). First, we note that
1− Φ(x) =
∫ +∞
t=x
1√
2π
exp
(−t2/2) dt
≤
∫ +∞
t=x
1√
2π
t
x
exp
(−t2/2) dt
=
1
x
√
2π
exp
(−x2/2)
=
φ(x)
x
where the inequality follows from t/x ≥ 1 for t ≥ x. This immediately implies that H(x) ≥ x.
Now, we show that
g(x) = 1− Φ(x)− x
x2 + 1
φ(x) ≥ 0
This follows from noting that
g′(x) = −φ(x)− 1− x
2
(x2 + 1)2
φ(x) +
x2
x2 + 1
φ(x)
=
x4 + x2 + x2 − 1− x4 − 2x2 − 1
(x2 + 1)2
φ(x)
= − 2
(x2 + 1)2
φ(x)
18
so g is a decreasing function with limx→+∞ g(x) = 0. Therefore,
H(x) ≤ x
2 + 1
x
= x+
1
x
Now, limx→−∞H(x) = 0 as φ(x)→ 0 and 1−Φ(x)→ 1. x ≤ H(x) ≤ x+ 1x is enough to show that
H(x) = x+ o(x) as x→ +∞. Finally,
H ′(x) =
−xφ(x) (1− Φ(x)) + φ(x)2
(1−Φ(x))2
= −xH(x) +H(x)2
= H(x) (H(x)− x)
≥ 0
as H(x) ≥ 0 and H(x) ≥ x. This concludes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
For simplicity of notations, we drop the i subscripts in the whole proof. We let Z1 = T , Z2 = (S,G)
and z2 = (s, g) ∈ R2, and apply Claim 3 with m1 = E[T ] = µ, m2 = [µ, µ]⊤, and
Σ =

 σ2 σ2 σ2σ2 σ2 + 1 σ2
σ2 σ2 σ2 + γ2


and we have Σ12 = [σ
2 σ2] and Σ22 =
[
σ2 + 1 σ2
σ2 σ2 + γ2
]
. Claim 3 yields
E [T |S = s,G = g] = µ+ 1
σ2 + γ2 + σ2γ2
(
σ2γ2(s− µ) + σ2(g − µ))
=
γ2
σ2 + γ2 + σ2γ2
µ+
σ2
σ2 + γ2 + σ2γ2
g
+
γ2σ2
σ2 + γ2 + σ2γ2
s.
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Therefore, it must be the case that
E [T |S ≥ β,G = g]
=
∫
s
E [T |S = s,G = g] Pr [S = s,G = g|S ≥ β,G = g] ds
=
∫
s≥β
E [T |S = s,G = g] Pr [S = s|S ≥ β,G = g] ds
=
γ2
σ2 + γ2 + σ2γ2
· µ+ σ
2
σ2 + γ2 + σ2γ2
· g
+
γ2σ2
σ2 + γ2 + σ2γ2
∫
s≥β
sPr [S = s|S ≥ β,G = g] ds
=
γ2
σ2 + γ2 + σ2γ2
· µ+ σ
2
σ2 + γ2 + σ2γ2
· g
+
γ2σ2
σ2 + γ2 + σ2γ2
E [S|S ≥ β,G = g]
Because (S,G) is a multivariate Gaussian, by Claim 3, S|G is a normal random variable with mean
µ+
σ2
σ2 + γ2
(g − µ) = γ
2
σ2 + γ2
· µ+ σ
2
σ2 + γ2
· g
and variance
σ2 + 1− σ
4
σ2 + γ2
=
σ2γ2 + σ2 + γ2
σ2 + γ2
It immediately follows that
E [S|S ≥ β,G = g]
=
γ2
σ2 + γ2
· µ+ σ
2
σ2 + γ2
· g
+
√
σ2γ2 + σ2 + γ2
σ2 + γ2
·H

β − γ2σ2+γ2 · µ− σ2σ2+γ2 · g√
σ2γ2+σ2+γ2
σ2+γ2


=
γ2
σ2 + γ2
· µ+ σ
2
σ2 + γ2
· g
+
√
σ2γ2 + σ2 + γ2
σ2 + γ2
·H
(
(σ2 + γ2) · β − γ2µ− σ2g√
(σ2 + γ2)(σ2 + γ2 + γ2σ2)
)
as it is the mean of Gaussian S|G = g truncated at β. Therefore, we have that
E [T |S ≥ β,G = g]
=
γ2
σ2 + γ2 + γ2σ2
(
1 +
σ2γ2
σ2 + γ2
)
µ
+
σ2
σ2 + γ2 + γ2σ2
(
1 +
σ2γ2
σ2 + γ2
)
g
+
γ2σ2√
(σ2 + γ2)(σ2 + γ2 + γ2σ2)
·H
(
(σ2 + γ2) · β − γ2µ− σ2g√
(σ2 + γ2)(σ2 + γ2 + γ2σ2)
)
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The term in front of µ is
γ2
σ2 + γ2 + σ2γ2
(
1 +
σ2γ2
σ2 + γ2
)
=
γ2
σ2 + γ2 + σ2γ2
σ2 + γ2 + σ2γ2
σ2 + γ2
=
γ2
σ2 + γ2
Similarly, the term in front of g is given by
σ2
σ2 + γ2 + σ2γ2
(
1 +
σ2γ2
σ2 + γ2
)
=
σ2
σ2 + γ2
A.4 Proof of Corollary 1
Continuity and differentiability follow immediately from the closed-form expression for the mean,
and the fact that the hazard rate is continuous and differentiable. The limits at +∞ for g and
both limits for βi follow directly from the fact that limx→−∞H(x) = 0, limx→+∞H(x) = +∞ by
Claim 4. As g → −∞,
(σ2 + γ2) · β − γ2µ− σ2g√
(σ2 + γ2)(σ2 + γ2 + γ2σ2)
→ +∞,
and as x→ +∞, H(x) = x+ o (1) by Claim 4. Therefore,
ei(µi, σi, βi, g)
=
γ2
σ2i + γ
2
µi +
σ2i
σ2 + γ2
g
+
γ2σ2i√
(σ2i + γ
2)(σ2i + γ
2 + γ2σ2i )
· (σ
2
i + γ
2) · βi − γ2µi − σ2i g√
(σ2i + γ
2)(σ2i + γ
2 + γ2σ2i )
+ og→−∞(1)
The term in front of g is given by
σ2i
σ2 + γ2
(
1− γ
2σ2i
σ2i + γ
2 + γ2σ2i
)
> 0
hence the limit at −∞ is −∞. Monotonicity in βi is immediate from the fact that the hazard rate
of a normal random variable is strictly increasing by Claim 4. Finally, the mean of a truncated
Gaussian is strictly increasing in the mean parameter of the Gaussian at constant variance. In
particular, Si|Gi = g is Gaussian with mean γ
2
σ2i+γ
2µ+
σ2i
σ2+γ2 g and variance constant in both g and
µ by Claim 3; therefore, E [Si|Gi = g, Si ≥ βi] is monotone strictly increasing in γ
2
σ2i +γ
2µ +
σ2i
σ2i+γ
2 g,
and hence in g and in µ. Because by the proof of Lemma 1,
E [Ti|Si ≥ β,Gi = g] = γ
2
σ2 + γ2 + σ2γ2
µi +
σ2
σ2 + γ2 + σ2γ2
g
+
γ2σ2
σ2 + γ2 + σ2γ2
E [Si|Si ≥ β,Gi = g] ,
it immediately follow that E [Ti|Gi = g, Si ≥ β] is strictly increasing in g and in µi.
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A.5 Proof of Lemma 2
In the whole proof, we write Pi(t) = φ
(
t−µi
σi
)
be the probability density function of a normal
random variable with mean µi and variance σ
2
i , evaluated at t.
Claim 8. xi(.) is continuous, increasing, and xi(t) > 0 ∀t ∈ R.
Proof. Note that
xi(t) =
∫
s
Pr [Ai = 1|Si = s] Pr [Si = s|Ti = t] ds
=
∫
s
Ai(s)φ(s− t)ds
=
∫
u
Ai(u+ t)φ(u)du
Strict positivity and monotonicity follow immediately from the fact that Ai(.) is a non-zero, non-
decreasing admission rule. For any h > 0, as |Ai(s)| ≤ 1, we have that
|xi(t+ h)− xi(t)| ≤
∫
s
|φ(s− t− h)− φ(s− t)| ds
=
∫
u
|φ(u− h)− φ(u)| du
As φ(u− h)− φ(u) ≥ 0 iff u ≥ h/2, we further have that
|xi(t+ h)− xi(t)| ≤
∫
u≥h/2
(φ(u− h)− φ(u)) du
+
∫
u≤h/2
(φ(u)− φ(u− h)) du
= 2 (Φ(h/2)− Φ(−h/2))
Therefore, it follows that
lim
h→0+
|xi(t+ h)− xi(t)| → 0
and by a similar argument that
lim
h→0−
|xi(t+ h)− xi(t)| → 0
This concludes the proof.
We can now proceed to the proof of Lemma 2:
Proof. For simplicity of notations, let
hi(g, t) = φ
(
g − t
γ
)
xi(t)Pi(t)
and remark that we can write
Ei
[
T ki |Gi = g,Ai = 1
]
=
∫
t t
khi(g, t)dt∫
t hi(g, t)dt
.
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xi(t) > 0 ∀t ∈ R from Claim 8, and Pi(t) > 0 for all t ∈ R, therefore
∫
t hi(g, t)dt > 0 ∀g ∈ R and
the above expectation is well-defined. For all k,
∫
t Pi(t)dt,
∫
t |t|kPi(t)dt < +∞ because the moment
generating function of a Gaussian exists and is finite, and
∣∣∣xi(t)φ( g−tγ )∣∣∣ ≤ 1√2piγ , therefore thi(g, t)
and hi(g, t) are integrable for all g. We have that for all t, hi is differentiable everywhere in g, and
that
∂hi
∂g
(g, t) =
t− g
γ2
· φ
(
g − t
γ
)
xi(t)Pi(t).
Since x→ |x| exp (−x2/2γ2) ≤ γe−1/2 for all x, we have that
|t− g| exp (−(t− g)2/2γ2) ≤ γe−1/2
hence
∣∣∣∂h∂g (g, t)∣∣∣ ≤ γe−1/2√2piγ Pi(t) and
∣∣∣tk · ∂h∂g (g, t)∣∣∣ ≤ γe−1/2√2piγ tkPi(t). Since Pi(t) and |t|kPi(t) are
integrable (because the moment generating function of a Gaussian exists and is finite), we can
differentiate under the integral sign and show that
∂
∂g
[∫
t
hi(g, t)dt
]
=
∫
t
∂hi
∂g
(g, t)dt
and
∂
∂g
[∫
t
tk · hi(g, t)dt
]
=
∫
t
tk
∂hi
∂g
(g, t)dt
Therefore, Ei
[
T ki |Gi = g,Ai = 1
]
is differentiable (hence continuous) in g and has derivative
∂
∂g
Ei
[
T ki |Gi = g,Ai = 1
]
=
1
γ2
∫
t t
k(t− g)hi(g, t)dt ·
∫
t hi(g, t)dt(∫
t hi(g, t)dt
)2
− 1
γ2
∫
t t
khi(g, t)dt ·
∫
t(t− g)hi(g, t)dt(∫
t hi(g, t)dt
)2
=
1
γ2
(∫
t t
k+1hi(g, t)dt∫
t hi(g, t)dt
−
∫
t t
khi(g, t)dt∫
t hi(g, t)dt
·
∫
t thi(g, t)dt∫
t hi(g, t)dt
)
=
1
γ2
Ei
[
T k+1i
∣∣∣Ai = 1, Gi = g]
− 1
γ2
Ei
[
T ki
∣∣∣Ai = 1, Gi = g] · Ei [Ti|Ai = 1, Gi = g]
A.6 Proof of Claim 5
Conditional on acceptance, Si ≥ C+ and hence so Ti ≥ C+ with probability 1. Hence, for any
grading policy and any grade g it must be that
E [Ti|Gi = g,Ai = 1] ≥ C+
Therefore, the employer hires all students accepted by the school, and IGM holds. Because the
probability of being hired by the employer is then just given by Ai(t) for a student with type t,
and because A1(t) = A2(t), equal opportunity also holds.
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B Hardness of equal opportunity in the single threshold case
Lemma 5. For any school hiring cost C, and any two Gaussians priors with different means
µ1 > µ2 and same variances σ1 = σ2, there exists no thresholding admission rules such that IGM
and equal opportunity hold at the same time.
Proof. Fix any hiring cost C. For simplicity, in the rest of the proof, we let g∗i = g
∗
i (C). A student
with grade g in population i is accepted if and only if g ≥ g∗i (C). Therefore, a student with type t
in population i gets accepted w.p.
xi(t) Pr [Gi ≥ g∗i |Ti = t] = xi(t)
∫
g≥g∗i
φ
(
g − t
γ
)
dg
= xi(t)
(
1− Φ
(
g∗i − t
γ
))
and we require
x1(t)
x2(t)
=
1−Φ
(
g∗
2
−t
γ
)
1−Φ
(
g∗
1
−t
γ
)
In the case of a thresholding admission rule with threshold βi in population i, we have that
xi(t) =
∫
s≥βi
φ(s− t)ds = 1− Φ (βi − t)
and the above equation becomes
1−Φ (β1 − t)
1−Φ (β2 − t) =
1−Φ
(
g∗2−t
γ
)
1−Φ
(
g∗
1
−t
γ
) (1)
Note that if IGM holds, i.e. if g∗1 = g
∗
2 = g
∗, then it must be the case that β1 = β2 = β. Remember
that at a fixed variance σ, we have that E[Ti|Gi = g, Si ≥ β] is a strictly increasing function of µi
at fixed β, σ, g∗ by Corollary 1, therefore implying that
E[T1|G1 = g, S1 ≥ β1] > E[T2|G2 = g, S2 ≥ β2]
for all g. It must then be the case that g∗1 > g
∗
2 , which is a contradiction.
Lemma 6. Fix any school hiring cost C. For γ 6= 1, equal opportunity is impossible with any
thresholding admission rule for any two Gaussians with different means µ1 > µ2 and same variances
σ1 = σ2. When γ = 1, equal opportunity holds if and only if the thresholds β1 and β2 can be chosen
such that simultaneously,
β1 = g
∗
2(C) and β2 = g
∗
1(C),
or equivalently,
E [T1|G1 = β2, S1 ≥ β1] = E [T2|G2 = β1, S2 ≥ β2] = C.
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Proof. Since IGM cannot hold when equal opportunity holds, we can assume that g∗1 6= g∗2 w.l.o.g.
Pick the population numbers such that g∗1 > g
∗
2 . It is then the case that
1− Φ
(
g∗
2
−t
γ
)
1− Φ
(
g∗
1
−t
γ
) < 1
which in turns implies that
1− Φ (β1 − t)
1− Φ (β2 − t) < 1
so we need β1 < β2. Since for all t,
1− Φ (β1 − t)
1− Φ (β2 − t) =
1− Φ
(
g∗
2
−t
γ
)
1− Φ
(
g∗
1
−t
γ
) ,
the derivatives of the left-hand side and of the right-hand side need be equal for all t. Letting
H(t) = φ(t)1−Φ(t) the hazard rate of a standard normal random variable, the equality of derivatives
can be written
1− Φ (β1 − t)
1− Φ (β2 − t) · (H(β1 − t)−H(β2 − t))
=
1
γ2
1− Φ
(
g∗2−t
γ
)
1− Φ
(
g∗
1
−t
γ
) · (H (g∗1 − t
γ
)
−H
(
g∗2 − t
γ
))
which further simplifies thanks to Equation (1) into
H(β1 − t)−H(β2 − t)
H
(
g∗
2
−t
γ
)
−H
(
g∗
1
−t
γ
) = 1
γ2
As t→ +∞, 1−Φ(βi− t), 1−Φ
(
g∗1−t
γ
)
→ 1, and as β1 < β2, g∗1 > g∗2 , φ(β1− t)−φ(β2− t) ∼t→+∞
φ(β1 − t), φ
(
g∗2−t
γ
)
− φ
(
g∗1−t
γ
)
∼t→+∞ φ
(
g∗2−t
γ
)
H(β1 − t)−H(β2 − t)
H
(
g∗
2
−t
γ
)
−H
(
g∗
1
−t
γ
) ∼t→+∞ φ(β1 − t)
φ
(
g∗
2
−t
γ
)
This limit is either 0 or +∞ unless γ = 1, β1 = g∗2 , in which case it is 1. It must therefore be the
case that γ = 1, β1 = g
∗
2 ; note that this directly implies that β2 = g
∗
1 must hold too, otherwise
1− Φ (β1 − t)
1− Φ
(
g∗
2
−t
γ
) = 1 6= 1−Φ (β2 − t)
1− Φ
(
g∗
1
−t
γ
)
which contradicts Equation (1).
25
C Extension to non-deterministic admission rules
The proofs only need make use of the fact that g∗(.) is a strictly increasing, continuous and differ-
entiable function on domain R, and are otherwise identical to the proofs for thresholding admission
rules. We show that said properties of g∗(.) hold for non-deterministic allocation rules below, in
Lemma 7 Lemma 8.
Claim 9. Let µ1, µ2 ∈ R, σ1, σ2 > 0, and φ the density of a standard Normal random variable.
Then
φ
(
µ1−t
σ1
)
φ
(
µ2−t
σ2
)
∫
t
(
µ1−t
σ1
)
φ
(
µ2−t
σ2
)
dt
is the probability density function of a Normal random variable with mean
µ =
σ22µ1 + σ
2
1µ2
σ21 + σ
2
2
and variance
σ2 =
1
1
σ2
1
+ 1
σ2
2
=
σ21σ
2
2
σ21 + σ
2
2
Proof.
φ
(
µ1 − t
σ1
)
φ
(
µ2 − t
σ2
)
= D exp
(
−(µ1 − t)
2
2σ21
+
(µ2 − t)2
2σ22
)
= D exp
(
−
(
1
2σ21
+
1
2σ22
)
t2 +
(
µ1
σ21
+
µ2
σ22
)
t−
(
µ21
2σ21
+
µ2
2σ22
))
= K exp

−1
2
(
1
σ21
+
1
σ22
)(
t−
µ1
σ2
1
+ µ2
σ2
2
1
σ2
1
+ 1
σ2
2
)2
for some non-zero constants D and K. This concludes the proof.
Lemma 7. Let ei(µi, g) = Ei [Ti|Gi = g,Ai = 1] in population i. Then i) ei(.) is strictly increasing
in both g and µi, ii) L
− = limg→−∞ ei(µi, g) and L+ = limg→+∞ ei(µi, g) exist (and are possibly in-
finite) and iii) g → ei(µi, g) is invertible and its inverse g∗i (.) is strictly increasing and differentiable
on (L−, L+).
Proof. For all g ∈ R, we have by Lemma 2 that
∂ei
∂g
(g) = Ei
[
T 2i |Gi = g,Ai = 1
]− Ei [Ti|Gi = g,Ai = 1]2
This is exactly the variance of a random variable Ti(g) with probability density function t →
Pr [Ti = t|Gi = g,Ai = 1]. Because for all g, xi(t)Pi(t)φ
(
g−t
γ
)
is continuous by Claim 8, Pr [Ti = t|G = g,Ai = 1]
cannot put all of its probability mass on a single value of t, and it must therefore be the case that
26
Ti(g) has positive variance and
∂ei
∂g (g) > 0. Therefore ei(.) must be strictly increasing in g; the
exact same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 2 can be applied to µi by symmetry, and this shows
monotonicity. This also implies that the limits at ±∞ must exist (but may not be finite).
Finally, ei is a (differentiable hence) continuous and strictly increasing function so it is invertible;
as ei is differentiable, it directly implies that its inverse is also strictly increasing and differentiable
on its domain.
Lemma 8. L− = −∞ and L+ = +∞, and g∗i (.) is strictly increasing on R.
Proof. Since
xi(t) =
∫
s
Ai(s)φ(s − t)dt
we can write
ei(g) =
∫
t
∫
s tAi(s)φ(s − t)φ
(
g−t
γ
)
φ
(
µi−t
σi
)
ds dt∫
t
∫
sAi(s)φ(s− t)φ
(
g−t
γ
)
φ
(
µi−t
σi
)
ds dt
Using Claim 9 and letting
µi(g) =
γ2µi + σ
2
i g
σ2i + γ
2
which is an increasing function of g whose limits are ±∞ when g → ±∞, and
λi =
γ2σ2i
γ2 + σ2i
,
we have that
φ
(
g − t
γ
)
φ
(
µi − t
σi
)
= φ
(
µi(g) − t
λi
)∫
t
φ
(
g − t
γ
)
φ
(
µi − t
σi
)
dt
and
ei(g) =
∫
t
∫
s tAi(s)φ(s− t)φ
(
µ(g)−t
λ˜i
)
dt ds∫
t
∫
sAi(s)φ(s − t)φ
(
µ(g)−t
λi
)
dt ds
Note that ∣∣∣∣tAi(s)φ(s − t)φ
(
µi(g)− t
λi
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ |t|φ(s − t)φ
(
µi(g) − t
λi
)
and ∫
t
∫
s
|t|φ(s− t)φ
(
µi(g)− t
λi
)
ds dt
=
∫
t
|t|φ
(
µi(g)− t
λi
)∫
s
φ(s − t)ds dt
=
∫
t
|t|φ
(
µi(g)− t
λi
)
dt
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exists and is finite for any g ∈ R (as the normal distribution admits a moment generating function),
and the same argument holds for∫
t
∫
s
φ(s− t)φ
(
µi(g)− t
λi
)
ds dt.
Hence, Fubini’s theorem applies, and we can write
ei(g) =
∫
sAi(s)
∫
t tφ(s − t)φ
(
µi(g)−t
λi
)
dt ds∫
sAi(s)
∫
t φ(s− t)φ
(
µi(g)−t
λi
)
dt ds
By Claim 9, ∫
t
tφ(s− t)φ
(
µi(g)− t
λi
)
dt
=
(
λ2i s+ µi(g)
λ2i + 1
)
·
∫
t
φ(s − t)φ
(
µi(g)− t
λi
)
dt
and the expectation can be written
ei(g) =
µi(g)
λ2i + 1
+
λ2i
λ2i + 1
∫
s sAi(s)
∫
t φ(s− t)φ
(
µi(g)−t
λi
)
dt ds∫
sAi(s)
∫
t φ(s − t)φ
(
µi(g)−t
λi
)
dt ds
We further have that,
φ(s− t)φ
(
x− t
a
)
=
1
2πa
exp
(−(x− t)2/2− (x− t)2/2a2)
and we can write
(s− t)2 + (x− t)2/a2
=
a2 + 1
a2
t2 − 2
(
a2s+ x
a2 + 1
)
a2 + 1
a2
t+
x2 + a2s
a2
=
a2 + 1
a2
(
t− a
2s+ x
a2 + 1
)2
+
x2 + a2s
a2
− (a
2s+ x)2
a2(a2 + 1)
=
a2 + 1
a2
(
t− a
2s+ x
a2 + 1
)2
+
(x− s)2
a2 + 1
28
Therefore, ∫
t
φ(s− t)φ
(
µi(x)− t
ai
)
dt
=
1
2πa
exp
(
− (x− s)
2
2(a2 + 1)
)∫
t
exp
(
−a
2 + 1
2a2
(
t− a
2s+ x
a2 + 1
)2)
dt
=
1
2πa
exp
(
− (x− s)
2
2(a2 + 1)
)
·
√
2π
a√
a2 + 1
=
1√
2π(a2 + 1)
exp
(
− (x− s)
2
2(a2 + 1)
)
= φ
(
x− s√
a2 + 1
)
and
ei(g) =
µi(g)
λ2i + 1
+
λ2i
1 + λ2i
∫
s sAi(s)φ
(
µi(g)−s√
λ2i+1
)
ds
∫
sAi(s)φ
(
µi(g)−s√
λ2i+1
)
ds
Note that ∫
s
Ai(s)φ

µi(g)− s√
λ2i + 1

 ds > 0
for monotone and non-zero Ai(s), and
Ai(s)φ

µi(g) − s√
λ2i + 1

 , sAi(s)φ

µi(g)− s√
λ2i + 1


are absolutely integrable as |Ai(s)| ≤ 1 hence integrable for all g, so∫
s sAi(s)φ
(
µi(g)−s√
λ2i+1
)
ds
∫
sAi(s)φ
(
µi(g)−s√
λ2i+1
)
ds
is finite for all g, and in particular for g = 0. By the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 2,
ei(g) is a non-decreasing function of µi(g) and hence of g. Therefore, for g < 0 we have that
ei(g) ≤ µi(g)
λ2i + 1
+
λ2i
1 + λ2i
∫
sAi(s)φ
(
µi(0)−s√
λ2i+1
)
ds
∫
sAi(s)φ
(
µi(0)−s√
λ2i+1
)
ds
which implies L− = −∞, and similarly L+ = +∞ as for g > 0,
ei(g) ≥ µi(g)
λ2i + 1
+
λ2i
1 + λ2i
∫
sAi(s)φ
(
µi(0)−s√
λ2i+1
)
ds
∫
sAi(s)φ
(
µi(0)−s√
λ2i+1
)
ds
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